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Abstract—Model checking allows an abstracted finite state
model of a system to be developed and a set of mathematically
defined correctness properties, based on the design specifications,
to be defined. The model checker performs an exhaustive state
space search of the model, checking the correctness properties
hold at each step. This paper describes how model checking
has been applied to find and correct problems in the software
design of a distributed vessel control system currently under
development at a control systems specialist in New Zealand.
I. INTRODUCTION
A New Zealand based control systems specialist are cur-
rently developing a fully redundant distributed vessel con-
trol system. The Time-Triggered Controller-Area-Network
(TTCAN) protocol is used for communication between mod-
ules on the system. In distributed systems such as this, the
interaction between a number of concurrently executing mod-
ules often results in unexpected sequences of events occurring
in the system. The complicated nature of these systems often
leads to design errors which are difficult to detect using
conventional techniques such as code walk throughs, peer
reviews, unit testing, and functional testing [1]. The aim of
this research was to apply model checking techniques to assist
in verifying the correct operation of the implementation of the
TTCAN protocol in the control system.
Using traditional testing techniques it is only feasible to
focus on verifying a small subset of possible sequences of
events that can occur in a system. As a result, catastrophic
failures that have a low probability of occurring are often
overlooked. This is especially relevant in concurrent systems,
due to the complex sequences of events that can be generated.
A model checker can be used to target complicated areas of
a system, checking all possible sequences of events against
specified correctness properties [1]. State space restrictions
prevent large portions of the system from being verified by
the model checker, but model checking is a useful tool which
can be added to the development process, and used in addition
to traditional testing techniques to help gain confidence in a
design.
Section II gives an overview of model checking, the TTCAN
protocol, and the implementation of the control system. Sec-
tion III describes models of the procedures used to determine
the active time-master and to select the currently active bus in
this implementation of TTCAN. Section IV describes the cor-
rectness properties developed to check against the model and
presents the verification results. Finally, Section V concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
This section briefly introduces model checking, gives an
overview of the TTCAN protocol, and describes how it is
implemented in the control system.
A. Model checking
Model checking is a technique used to automatically verify
correctness properties against a finite state model of a system.
A concurrent program can be visualised as a Finite State
Machine (FSM) or automaton. The state of the system is the
current expression being executed in each of the concurrent
processes and the current set of values of variables at a specific
time. The FSM contains nodes to represent every possible state
the system enters and edges to represent possible transitions
between states [4]. A model-checker traverses all possible
paths through the concurrent system’s FSM, checking specified
safety and liveness properties at each step. If a property
is disproved a counter-example is generated showing the
sequence of events leading to the violation of the property. The
counter-example is a valuable aid in debugging a system [3].
One model checker that has become increasingly popular
in industry is the SPIN model checker. The input specification
language to SPIN for describing a model is called Process
Meta-Language (PROMELA). Correctness properties to be
checked against the system are described using Linear Tem-
poral Logic (LTL). A processes is created in PROMELA to
represent the control flow of a program. The individual threads
of a multi-threaded application or simultaneously executing
nodes on a distributed network are modelled in PROMELA
by creating multiple processes. Shared variables and message
channels are used to model interprocess communication.
Temporal logic formulae are logical statements that allow
sequences of a program’s states to be described [2]. In SPIN,
LTL formulae are used to specify safety and liveness properties
to check against a model. Safety properties are checks that
a correctness property holds over an exhaustive state space
search of a model. A safety property specifies that an event or
combination of events never happens. This is represented in
LTL by the always operator (◻), meaning the specified propo-
sition is always invariantly satisfied throughout the search. A
liveness property specifies that an event or combination of
events eventually happens. Liveness is represented in LTL by
the eventually operator (◇), meaning the specified property
is eventually satisfied during the search. Checking liveness
properties is important, as a safety property may hold in the
trivial case where the process is doing nothing at all. Operators
can be combined to specify more interesting properties, for
example, the always and eventually operators are combined to
check that an event occurs infinitely often in a system. The
model must always eventually pass through a certain state to
satisfy the property [4].
B. TTCAN overview
Modern vehicles contain complicated distributed control
systems. Currently, the CAN protocol is one of the most
popular communications protocols used in these types of net-
works [5]. CAN is an asynchronous event-triggered protocol,
meaning that events are sent around the network as they occur.
Due to the event-triggered nature of the protocol, conflicts can
occur on the bus when multiple messages are sent simultane-
ously. A priority-based arbitration scheme is used to determine
which message is transmitted on the bus. This introduces non-
deterministic latency to message transmissions, complicating
the design of systems with tight timing constraints, such as
a closed-loop distributed control system like those used in
vehicle’s brake or steer by-wire systems [8].
The increasing size and complexity of these types of sys-
tems has introduced a need for a variant of the protocol that
provides deterministic timing across the system. This makes
system design simpler and the design of more complicated
systems possible. Time-Triggered CAN (TTCAN) is a variant
of the CAN protocol that offers more precise timing. The
TTCAN protocol is the addition of a session layer (layer 5 of
the OSI model), defined by ISO 11898-4 [7], to the existing
data link (OSI layer 2) and physical (OSI layer 1) layers of
the existing CAN protocol [6].
TTCAN is a synchronous (time-triggered) protocol, where
the transmission of messages is based on the progression of a
globally synchronised time base. Each node has a pre-defined
schedule of messages to transmit in pre-allocated time-slots.
This way conflicts on the bus are eliminated and message
latencies can be guaranteed [8].
Time synchronisation is achieved by the periodic transmis-
sion of a specific message known as a ‘reference message’
from a designated time-master node. On receiving the Start
of Frame (SOF) bit of the reference message, all node’s
pre-defined transmission cycles are restarted. Messages will
be sent when their scheduled time-slot becomes active. The
period elapsed between two consecutive reference messages
is known as a ‘basic-cycle’, and a number of ‘basic-cycles’
with different message schedules may be repeated in a ‘matrix-
cycle’ [5].
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the redundant control system.
Using a time-triggered protocol allows deterministic timing
of transmissions and a higher portion of the overall bandwidth
of the system to be utilised. However, the latency of trans-
missions may be greater than when using an event-triggered
protocol.
C. Implementation of TTCAN in the control system
The system to be analysed is a dual redundant distributed
vessel control system based on the TTCAN protocol. The
redundant CAN buses are labelled P and Q in Figure 1. The
vessel is usually wired with a bus running down each side of
the vessel. The system consists of three main types of modules:
Control Input Devices (CID), Master Controllers (MC), and
Hydraulic Controllers (HC). Each module is connected to both
of the redundant CAN buses.
CIDs take input actions from the operator such as adjusting
the throttle or steering the vessel and translate these to input
commands that are sent to the MC. The CIDs have redundant
microcontrollers, each connected to one of the redundant CAN
buses.
The MC processes control input commands from the CIDs
and feedback messages from the HCs. It translates these
commands and feedback into output demands that are sent
to the HC. The microcontroller on the MC has two CAN
controller modules, one connected to the P bus, and the other
to the Q bus, as shown in Figure 1. When the currently active
time-master MC transmits messages, they are sent on both
CAN buses. The MC is the time-master of the system; it
is responsible for synchronising the message schedules of
the other network nodes. This is achieved by the active MC
periodically sending a TTCAN sync reference message.
III. APPLYING MODEL CHECKING TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the models developed for model
checking the vessel control system. The model checking work
here focuses on the implementation of the TTCAN protocol,
as this is a major component of the control system. The
approach taken was to develop multiple models focused on
specific aspects of the system, rather than one monolithic
model. It was found that developing a number of separate
smaller models was essential in checking this system due
to its size and complexity. Using this technique, we were
able to model the system efficiently without encountering the
state space explosion problem. Two of the PROMELA models
developed during the model checking work are described in
this section. The models described are:● A model of the active time-master election process, called
the “voter” process in the implementation, analyses the
election procedure that determines the active time-master
on startup or reintegration.● A model of the module in the MC that selects which
of the redundant buses currently active buses the node
is currently listening to, called the “signal picker” in the
implementation.
After talking with the development engineers and analysing
the code, it appeared that the correct operation of the redundant
MC nodes is crucial to the safety of their system, and checking
the correctness of the “voter” procedure is essential to the
correct operation of the MC. The periodic sync reference
message sent from the currently active time-master MC is the
heart-beat of the system. The reference message triggers and
synchronises the transmission schedules of all the other nodes
in the system. Without the sync reference message, exclusive
window messages, responsible for control of the vessel, are
not transferred from the helm and throttle to the hydraulic
controller. Also, crucial to the correct operation of the MC is
the “signal picker” module. This is responsible for selecting
which of the redundant buses the MC is currently listening to.
A. “Voter” model
Figure 2 shows the “voter” state machine from the im-
plementation, that this model is based on. Scenarios where
intermittent faults cause time-master nodes to periodically
toggle on and off are modelled, as well as the addition of
initial startup delays of the MC nodes.
The “voter” model consists of two MC nodes, a CID,
and a HC. The MC nodes are represented in the model
by TimeMasterNode processes and each is associated
with a PeriodicTimer process, as shown in Figure 3.
In this model, the MCs simulate the “voter” procedure. The
AdvTimeBusArb process is responsible for handling the
progression of time, message transmissions, and CAN bus
arbitration in the model.
The “voter” state machine is implemented in the
model as a non-deterministic if ... fi construct in
the TimeMasterNode processes, as shown in Listing 2.
Guard statements of the construct test the value of the
currentState variable to determine the state in the “voter”
procedure that the node is currently in. When the MC is
first initialised, the state machine defaults to the INVALID
state. Following this, a check is made to see if the node
was previously the active time-master before the reset. If
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Fig. 2: State machine of time-master election process in MC
nodes.
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Fig. 3: Block diagram showing processes and connections
between them in the “voter” model.
this is the case, the node will transition to the INITIALLY
and then TOOKOVER states. If the MC was not previously
the active time-master it will transition to the STANDBY
state. On entering the STANDBY state, the MC will start
a 3 s timeout by setting the standbyTimer variable to
STANDBY_TIMEOUT. This timeout is reset when a “master
status” message is received from an active time-master MC. If
a “master status” message is not received within the 3 s timeout
period, the backup time-master takes over as the active time-
master, by transitioning from the STANDBY to TOOKOVER
state. If both nodes are currently in the TOOKOVER state and
configured as the active time-master the node with the highest
priority, which is defined as the node with the lowest identifier,
will become the sole active time-master.
A timer in each MC is used to periodically trigger transmis-
sion of a message representing the “master status” message
used in the implementation. The “master status” message
conveys the current state of each MC to the other; it allows a
MC to determine whether the other MC is in active or backup
mode. An abstraction is made to simplify modelling of the
“master status” message transmission. In the model, when
the “master status” message is correctly received at a node,
the rxMsgBuff flag in the receiving node’s MsgStatus
structure is set, as shown in Listing 2. When processing the
“master status” message in the MC a global variable called
ActiveTimeMaster is checked. This is used to determine
whether the other MC node is in active or backup states. An
assumption is made here that the “master status” message is
always transmitted, received, and decoded correctly by the MC
nodes.
Listing 1: PROMELA source from the “TimeMasterNode”
process, used to check if a “master status” message has been
received from the other MC node.
/* Received a master status message from other
MC node. */
IF MsgStatus[nodeNum].rxMsgBuff
[MASTER_STATUS_OFFSET + nodeNum] != false ->
5 MsgStatus[nodeNum].rxMsgBuff
[MASTER_STATUS_OFFSET + nodeNum] = false;
recvMasterStatus = true;
FI;
Listing 2: PROMELA source from the “TimeMasterNode”
process, used to model the “voter” state machine.
/* Update the active time-master state at the end
of each 50ms cycle. */
if
:: currentState == INVALID ->
5 if
:: ActiveTimeMaster[nodeNum] != false ->
currentState = INITIALLY;
:: else ->
currentState = STANDBY;
10 fi;
:: currentState == INITIALLY ->
currentState = TOOKOVER;
:: currentState == TOOKOVER ->
/* Had timeout from standby state, now enters
15 the ‘TOOKOVER’ state. */
ActiveTimeMaster[nodeNum] = true;
/* Received master status message from a node
which is currently an active master. */
IF (recvMasterStatus != false)
20 && (ActiveTimeMaster[1 - nodeNum]
!= false) ->
if
:: nodeNum == NODE_1 ->
/* Do nothing as this is the node with
25 higher priority (lower identifier).
Remains as the active time-master. */
:: nodeNum == NODE_2 ->
currentState = STANDBY;
ActiveTimeMaster[nodeNum] = false;
30 :: else ->
skip;
fi;
FI;
:: currentState == STANDBY ->
35 if
:: standbyTimer != 0 ->
standbyTimer = standbyTimer - 1;
IF standbyTimer == 0 ->
currentState = TOOKOVER;
40 FI;
:: else ->
standbyTimer = STANDBY_TIMEOUT;
fi;
/* If received a ‘master status’ message and
45 the other node is the active master, then
reset the timeout. */
IF ((recvMasterStatus != false)
&& (ActiveTimeMaster[1 - nodeNum]
!= false)) ->
50 standbyTimer = STANDBY_TIMEOUT;
FI;
:: else ->
skip;
fi;
The PeriodicTimer associated with each
TimeMasterNode is responsible for externally triggering
periodic events in the TimeMasterNode process. In this
case, it is used to periodically toggle the time-master on and
off at a certain rate, in order to model a periodic fault at the
node. An external process must be used to handle this due to
the technique used for modelling timing. A timeout period
is passed as a parameter along with a count for the number
of timeouts elapsed before the node toggles state. In this
model, the timeout period is one basic-cycle, with a duration
of 50ms as is the case in the implementation.
A startup delay is modelled in the same way as in the
other TTCAN protocol models. The initial startup delay is
passed as a parameter when initialising the corresponding
TimeMasterNode process. This is used to model the exist-
ing startup delay of the MC, due to initialisation of the boot-
block and threading, and is able to be adjusted to simulate
other delays.
B. “Signal picker” model
The “signal picker” is a module that exists in the MC
and is responsible for selecting which of the redundant buses
the MC is currently listening to. The “signal picker” model
verifies the module’s interaction with the environment. The
model simulates messages received on either bus, messages
reporting errors from their source, dropped messages, and
the periodic state updates of the module as occurs in the
implementation. Correctness properties have been developed
based on the developer’s design specifications. Assertions are
used in the model to check the properties hold. The model
checks each of the possible interleavings of events between the
signal picker and the redundant buses. In this case, an untimed
model has been used; it was not necessary to include the
timing of events relative to each other to check the properties
specified.
The model consists of a process that represents the “signal
picker” module, and a process, called TriggerInputs, that
models the interaction of the “signal picker” module with its
environment. The “signal picker” reacts to events triggered by
the TriggerInputs process.
The TriggerInputs process non-deterministically trig-
gers events that occur in the environment and in the “sig-
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Fig. 4: Diagram showing “signal picker” module’s connections
within the MC.
nal picker”, such as: receiving messages, simulating missed
(dropped) messages, and initialising the periodic update of
the state of the “signal picker”. The periodic update is trig-
gered every 1.5 s in the implementation, but is triggered non-
deterministically in the model as the update could occur at any
time relative to the messages being received on the bus.
The “signal picker” process model makes decisions about
whether or not to swap buses whenever a new message
is received. Received messages are non-deterministically de-
termined to be either messages received without error or
messages indicating sensor errors at the message source. The
model also includes a check that the rules related to swapping
to the redundant bus are not broken after a new message has
been received or the state of the module has been updated.
IV. VERIFICATION OF MODELS
This section describes the correctness properties and failure
scenarios developed to check against the “voter” and “signal
picker” models, as well as the results of the verification.
A. “Voter” model
The LTL correctness properties checked against the model
to gain confidence that the implementation of the voter pro-
cedure meets the designers original specifications are:
1) ◇◻(tm1_active && !tm2_active) — The
potential time-master node (Node 1) eventually always
becomes the active time-master and Node 2 becomes
the backup time-master.
2) ◇◻(tm2_active) — If Node 1 is disabled then
Node 2 eventually always becomes the active time-
master. In this test, after the initial startup sequence,
Node 1 is disabled.
3) ◻◇!(tm1_active && tm2_active) — Al-
ways eventually Node 1 and Node 2 are not both the
active time-master.
4) ◇◻!(tm1_active && tm2_active) — Even-
tually always Node 1 and Node 2 are not both the
active time-master.
5) ◻!(tm1_active && tm2_active) — Always
potential time-master nodes Node 1 and Node 2 are
not both the active time-master.
6) ◻◇(tm2_active) — Always eventually time-
master node Node 2 is active when Node 1 is dis-
abled following completion of the first basic-cycle.
7) Absence of violated assertions when the active time-
master node (Node 1) is toggled on and off every 1.5 s.
8) Absence of violated assertions when the active time-
master node (Node 1) is toggled on and off every 1.5 s,
and an initial bootup delay of the faulty active MC is
added.
The results of the verification of the correctness properties
checked against the voter model are:
● Properties 1 – 4 pass verification without error.● Property 5 fails verification. The error trails reveal two
situations where both potential time-masters are simul-
taneously configured as the active time-master. On the
initial startup of the system, both time-masters become
the active time-master after an initial timeout; the voter
state-machine then determines the winning time-master.
Also, if an active time-master is powered down the state
is stored in non-volatile memory and when the node is
reactivated, if the backup time-master has taken over and
become active, both nodes will be in this state.● Property 6 passes verification with the backup time-
master taking over as expected.● Property 7 fails when the on/off period is 3 s (1.5 s on
and 1.5 s off) and passes for all other intervals tested.
This kind of fault could potentially be caused by a
faulty alternator sending a voltage spike to the MC’s
power supply, causing it to periodically switch on and
off. The reason this period fails is because with the 3 s
period the node is active just long enough so that the
active time-master status message is able to be sent after
startup, as illustrated in Figure 5. From tests of the MC
hardware it was found the time-master status message
is sent approximately 1.3 s after the node is powered up.
This means, even with the 1.5 s periodic fault, the backup
MC will think there is still an active MC on the network
so will not timeout and takeover. In this case, 50% of the
MC messages are effectively lost from the active MC due
to the fault and the redundant MC will not takeover. An
up down counter is used as a check to see if 1 or more
messages have failed to be received at a node within a
basic-cycle period. If this count becomes greater than 20
an error is flagged. This is the case in the model when
the 3 s periodic fault is tested. The test shows that the
redundant MC does not take over as expected in this
situation.● Property 8 passes when an extra delay is added to the
time-master node.
B. “Signal picker” model
The following properties checked are based on the original
developer’s design specification:
1) The module will only ever swap to the other bus if the
current bus has received a message with an error value
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Fig. 5: Timing diagram showing the sequence of events that
causes the backup time-master to fail to takeover as the active
time-master as expected.
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Fig. 6: Timing diagram for intermittent error on bus P.
or a message has not been received since the status flags
have been last reset. There must be a message seen on
the bus that will be swapped to and no error messages
can be received on the bus. An assertion is used to check
this property whenever the model swaps buses.
2) If a message is dropped since the last time the modules
flags are reset a transition is made to the redundant bus.
Again, an assertion is used to check this property.
Property 1 passes verification; however, property 2 fails.
Messages can be dropped on the bus the module is currently
listening to without swapping to the backup bus, as shown
in Figure 6. The “signal picker” only swaps to the redundant
bus if no message has been seen (received correctly) on the
current bus or a message is seen with an error flag set. This
means if there is an intermittent fault on the bus it is possible
to lose a number of message since the last periodic reset of the
modules flags. In this case, as long as one message is received
the module will not switch to the redundant bus.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows an example of how model checking has
been successfully applied to an industrial problem. The model
of the “voter” procedure and correctness properties checked
against it has uncovered an unexpected situation where an
intermittent fault on the active MC prevents the backup MC
taking over as expected. The “signal picker” model revealed a
situation where a fault at a certain rate on the active bus could
prevent the MC from switching to the redundant bus. In the
implementation, both these situations could potentially lead to
a situation where the performance of the vessel is degraded or
control of the vessel is lost. Due to the complicated sequences
of events required to expose these problems, these issues may
have been missed under the current test scheme. In uncovering
these sorts of potentially hard to reproduce problems, the
results become valuable during the test phase as it gives more
insight into the design and the findings can be used to improve
the test framework.
In applying model checking techniques to this implemen-
tation of TTCAN, we have found model checking to be a
useful aid in the design phase of a large software project.
The process of developing the models of the implementation
allows a developer to gain a deeper understanding of the
code. Simulations of the model often revealed complicated
sequences of events that were not taken into account during the
initial software design, and these can now be checked to ensure
they do not cause the system to misbehave. Also, by creating
a model of the software and automatically verifying it against
a set of mathematically based design specifications, the devel-
oper can check the specifications against the implementation
in a rigorous way. This gives the developer more confidence
in the design, and that the design meets the specifications.
REFERENCES
[1] Feather, M., Fickas, S. and Razermera-Marny, N.A., Model-checking
for validation of a Fault Protection System, In Proc., 6th International
Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering, 2001.
[2] Holzmann, G.J., The SPIN Model checker: primer and reference manual,
Addison-Wesley, 2004.
[3] Stephan Merz. F. Cassez et al. (eds): Modeling and Verification of
Parallel Processes. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2067, pp. 3-38, 2001.
[4] Ben-Ari, M. Principles of the Spin Model Checker, Springer London,
2008.
[5] Leen, G. and Heffernan, D., TTCAN: a new time-triggered controller
area network, Microprocessors and Microsystems Journal, vol. 26, no.
2, pp. 77-94, 2002.
[6] ISO 11898-1, Road vehicles Controller area network (CAN) Part
1: Data link layer and physical signalling, International Standards
Orginisation, 2003.
[7] ISO 11898-4, Road vehicles Controller area network (CAN) Part
4: Time triggered communication, International Standards Orginisation,
2004.
[8] Fuhrer, T., Muller, B., Dieterle, W., Hartwich, F., Hugel, R. and Walther,
M., Time triggered communication on CAN (Time Triggered CAN -
TTCAN), Seventh International CAN Conference (ICC), Amsterdam,
Netherlands, 2000.
